According to Wittgenstein, the idea of pre-linguistic thought and of language as merely a vehicle for transmitting such thoughts is problematic. In his Philosophical Investigations (1953), he criticized the notion that children learn words primarily through ostensive definitions (e.g., pointing to an apple while saying “apple”). A child could not know whether the word refers to the fruit, its color, or its shape.
For Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is bound to its use within a web of other words. Thus, thoughts cannot precede languages or cultures, since language and culture are required to shape and define them.
When a child falls, hurts himself, and cries, and then learns from others to say “pain,” he is not selecting among multiple inner states the one that matches the word. Rather, he acquires a “new pain behavior,” learning from the community the uses of words. From these uses, the child builds not only communication but also the very texture of inner life.